近期的項目,前端的js是在localhost上跑的,而後向咱們後端的開發服務器進行請求。可是忽然前端說全部的post請求都報csrf校驗錯誤了,甚是奇怪,以前爲了開發方便已經把django的csrf middleware註釋掉了啊,爲何還會錯誤,因爲返回值格式仍是django rest的通用格式,確定問題是出在這裏面,因而翻了一下它的源代碼看了看。前端
from django.middleware.csrf import CsrfViewMiddleware class CSRFCheck(CsrfViewMiddleware): def _reject(self, request, reason): # Return the failure reason instead of an HttpResponse return reason class SessionAuthentication(BaseAuthentication): """ Use Django's session framework for authentication. """ def authenticate(self, request): """ Returns a `User` if the request session currently has a logged in user. Otherwise returns `None`. """ # Get the underlying HttpRequest object request = request._request user = getattr(request, 'user', None) # Unauthenticated, CSRF validation not required if not user or not user.is_active: return None self.enforce_csrf(request) # CSRF passed with authenticated user return (user, None) def enforce_csrf(self, request): """ Enforce CSRF validation for session based authentication. """ reason = CSRFCheck().process_view(request, None, (), {}) if reason: # CSRF failed, bail with explicit error message raise exceptions.PermissionDenied('CSRF Failed: %s' % reason)
原來是這樣,最近給系統增長了用戶登錄功能,使用的就是SessionAuthorization和TokenAuthorization,而後在SessionAuthorization中調用了self.enforce_csrf(request)
而這個調用的又是上面的CSRFCheck
,這個類是重載了django裏面的csrf middleware,並且沒發現有地方能夠關掉這個功能,即便在django裏面去掉這個middleware,可是這個仍是會調用的。django
那怎麼去掉這個功能呢,咱們如今就是要進行跨域請求。後端
self.enforce_csrf(request)
這一行代碼就好了或者在設置中添加一項,好比改爲GLOBAL_CSRF_CHECK = True if GLOBAL_CSRF_CHECK: self.enforce_csrf(request)
class CsrfViewMiddleware(object): """ Middleware that requires a present and correct csrfmiddlewaretoken for POST requests that have a CSRF cookie, and sets an outgoing CSRF cookie. This middleware should be used in conjunction with the csrf_token template tag. """ # The _accept and _reject methods currently only exist for the sake of the # requires_csrf_token decorator. def _accept(self, request): # Avoid checking the request twice by adding a custom attribute to # request. This will be relevant when both decorator and middleware # are used. request.csrf_processing_done = True return None def _reject(self, request, reason): logger.warning('Forbidden (%s): %s', reason, request.path, extra={ 'status_code': 403, 'request': request, } ) return _get_failure_view()(request, reason=reason) def process_view(self, request, callback, callback_args, callback_kwargs): if getattr(request, 'csrf_processing_done', False): return None try: csrf_token = _sanitize_token( request.COOKIES[settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME]) # Use same token next time request.META['CSRF_COOKIE'] = csrf_token except KeyError: csrf_token = None # Generate token and store it in the request, so it's # available to the view. request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] = _get_new_csrf_key() # Wait until request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] has been manipulated before # bailing out, so that get_token still works if getattr(callback, 'csrf_exempt', False): return None # Assume that anything not defined as 'safe' by RFC2616 needs protection if request.method not in ('GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS', 'TRACE'): if getattr(request, '_dont_enforce_csrf_checks', False): # Mechanism to turn off CSRF checks for test suite. # It comes after the creation of CSRF cookies, so that # everything else continues to work exactly the same # (e.g. cookies are sent, etc.), but before any # branches that call reject(). return self._accept(request) if request.is_secure(): # Suppose user visits http://example.com/ # An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a # POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and # submits it via JavaScript. # # The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but # that's no problem for a MITM and the session-independent # nonce we're using. So the MITM can circumvent the CSRF # protection. This is true for any HTTP connection, but anyone # using HTTPS expects better! For this reason, for # https://example.com/ we need additional protection that treats # http://example.com/ as completely untrusted. Under HTTPS, # Barth et al. found that the Referer header is missing for # same-domain requests in only about 0.2% of cases or less, so # we can use strict Referer checking. referer = request.META.get('HTTP_REFERER') if referer is None: return self._reject(request, REASON_NO_REFERER) # Note that request.get_host() includes the port. good_referer = 'https://%s/' % request.get_host() if not same_origin(referer, good_referer): reason = REASON_BAD_REFERER % (referer, good_referer) return self._reject(request, reason) if csrf_token is None: # No CSRF cookie. For POST requests, we insist on a CSRF cookie, # and in this way we can avoid all CSRF attacks, including login # CSRF. return self._reject(request, REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE) # Check non-cookie token for match. request_csrf_token = "" if request.method == "POST": request_csrf_token = request.POST.get('csrfmiddlewaretoken', '') if request_csrf_token == "": # Fall back to X-CSRFToken, to make things easier for AJAX, # and possible for PUT/DELETE. request_csrf_token = request.META.get('HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN', '') if not constant_time_compare(request_csrf_token, csrf_token): return self._reject(request, REASON_BAD_TOKEN) return self._accept(request) def process_response(self, request, response): if getattr(response, 'csrf_processing_done', False): return response # If CSRF_COOKIE is unset, then CsrfViewMiddleware.process_view was # never called, probaby because a request middleware returned a response # (for example, contrib.auth redirecting to a login page). if request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE") is None: return response if not request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE_USED", False): return response # Set the CSRF cookie even if it's already set, so we renew # the expiry timer. response.set_cookie(settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"], max_age = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 52, domain=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN, path=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_PATH, secure=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE, httponly=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY ) # Content varies with the CSRF cookie, so set the Vary header. patch_vary_headers(response, ('Cookie',)) response.csrf_processing_done = True return response
裏面主要有兩個函數,一個是process view,另外一個是process response。這裏就不得不說django middleware的工做原理了。跨域
https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.6/topics/http/middleware/服務器
process_request() is called on each request, before Django decides which view to execute. process_view() is called just before Django calls the view. process_response() is called on all responses before they’re returned to the browser.
因此這個middleware的process view會在請求到達view函數以前被調用,能夠理解爲一個過濾器吧。cookie
if request.method not in ('GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS', 'TRACE'): if getattr(request, '_dont_enforce_csrf_checks', False): return self._accept(request)
這裏request裏面有_dont_enforce_csrf_checks
就直接進入view了,沒有下面的檢查了。因此咱們只要本身給request添加一個這樣的屬性就行了。最直接的方法仍是去寫一個middleware啊,哈哈。session
代碼很簡單less
class DisableCSRFCheck(object): def process_request(self, request): setattr(request, '_dont_enforce_csrf_checks', True)