傳統檢測模式全部規則都是「閉環」的模式。就像HTTP自己同樣,單獨的規則是無狀態的。這意味着規則之間不共享信息,每一個規則都沒有關於任何先前規則匹配的信息。它僅使用其當前的單個規則邏輯進行檢測。在此模式下,若是規則觸發,它將執行當前規則中指定的任 何中斷/記錄日誌操做。
設置方法:
修改Crs-setup.confphp
# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking # - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a # rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403. # - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera. # - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or # perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html # SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403" SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
該設置爲上面提到的CRS傳統檢測模式。當CRS規則匹配時,它將被拒絕,而後告警數據將記錄到Apache error_log文件和ModSecurity審計日誌。如下是SQL注入
攻擊的一個示例error_log消息:html
[Tue Nov 16 16:02:38 2017] [error] [client ::1] ModSecurity: Access denied with code 403 (phase 2). Pattern match "\\bselect\\b.{0,40}\\buser\\b" at ARGS:foo. [file "/usr/local/apache/conf/modsec_current/base_rules/modsecurity_crs_41_sql_injection_attacks.conf"] [line "67"] [id "959514"] [rev "2.0.9"] [msg "Blind SQL Injection Attack"] [data "select * from user"] [severity "CRITICAL"] [tag "WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-19"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A1"] [tag "OWASP_AppSensor/CIE1"] [tag "PCI/6.5.2"] [hostname "localhost"] [uri "/vulnerable_app.php"] [unique_id "TOLxbsCoC2oAABvWGW4AAAAA"]
這種消息格式看起來與傳統的規則日誌格式相同。正則表達式
傳統檢測模式的優缺點:
優勢sql
缺點express
從安全角度來看並不是最佳apache
這種改進的檢測模式的核心理念是實施協做檢測和延遲阻塞。這意味着咱們經過將檢查/檢測與阻塞功能分離來改變規則邏輯。能夠運行單個規則,以便檢測仍
然存在,可是,不是在此時應用任何破壞性操做,而是會進行事務性異常評分記錄。另外,每一個規則還將存儲關於每一個規則匹配的元數據(例如規則ID,攻擊類
別,匹配位置和匹配數據)在惟一TX變量內。
設置方法:
修改Crs-setup.conf安全
SecDefaultAction "phase:1,pass,log" SecDefaultAction "phase:2,pass,log"
在這種新模式下,每一個匹配規則不會阻塞,而是會使用ModSecurity的setvar動做增長異常分數。如下是SQL注入CRS規則的一個示例,該規則使用setvar動做來
增長總體異常評分和SQL注入子類別評分:{rule.id}-OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION-%{matched_var_name}=%{tx.0}"session
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS| XML:/* "@detectSQLi" \ "msg:'SQL Injection Attack Detected via libinjection',\ id:942100,\ severity:'CRITICAL',\ rev:'1',\ ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.0.0',\ maturity:'1',\ accuracy:'8',\ phase:request,\ block,\ multiMatch,\ t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:removeNulls,t:removeComments,\ capture,\ logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\ tag:'application-multi',\ tag:'language-multi',\ tag:'platform-multi',\ tag:'attack-sqli',\ tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION',\ tag:'WASCTC/WASC-19',\ tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\ tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/CIE1',\ tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\ setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score},\ setvar:tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score},\ setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"
每一個規則都具備指定的嚴重性級別。咱們已經更新了規則,以容許異常評分收集增量使用宏擴展。這裏是一個例子:
例如上面那條規則的setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score},app
這容許用戶從crs-setup.conf文件中設置本身的異常評分值,並經過使用宏擴展將這些值傳播出來供規則使用。xss
# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Severity Levels ]] ---------------------------------------- # # Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level. # These are the default scoring points for each severity level. # These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches. # You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed. # # - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5. # Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files). # - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4. # Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files). # - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3. # Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files). # - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2. # Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files). # # In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative. # So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules. # # (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables. # In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure # that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.) # #SecAction \ # "id:900100,\ # phase:1,\ # nolog,\ # pass,\ # t:none,\ # setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\ # setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\ # setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\ # setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"
2.8以上版本的是在Crs-setup.conf中配置,看着比較亂了!!!
這種配置代表,嚴格等級爲「critical」的每一個CRS規則都會將每次規則匹配的事務異常分數提升5分。當咱們有規則匹配時,您能夠從modsec_debug.log文件中
看到常評分是如何加分的:
executing operator "rx" with param "\\bselect\\b.{0,40}\\buser\\b" against ARGS:foo. Target value: "\xe2\x80\x98 union select * from user &#" Added regex subexpression to TX.0: select * from user Operator completed in 14 usec. Ctl: Set auditLogParts to ABIFHZE. Setting variable: tx.msg=%{rule.msg} Resolved macro %{rule.msg} to: Blind SQL Injection Attack Set variable "tx.msg" to "Blind SQL Injection Attack". Setting variable: tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score} Recorded original collection variable: tx.sql_injection_score = "0" Resolved macro %{tx.critical_anomaly_score} to: 5 Relative change: sql_injection_score=0+5 Set variable "tx.sql_injection_score" to "5". Setting variable: tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score} Recorded original collection variable: tx.anomaly_score = "0" Resolved macro %{tx.critical_anomaly_score} to: 5 Relative change: anomaly_score=0+5 Set variable "tx.anomaly_score" to "5". Setting variable: tx.%{rule.id}-WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION-%{matched_var_name}=%{tx.0} Resolved macro %{rule.id} to: 959514 Resolved macro %{matched_var_name} to: ARGS:foo Resolved macro %{tx.0} to: select * from user Set variable "tx.959514-WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION-ARGS:foo" to "select * from user". Resolved macro %{TX.0} to: select * from user Warning. Pattern match "\bselect\b.{0,40}\buser\b" at ARGS:foo. [file "/usr/local/apache/conf/modsec_current/base_rules/modsecurity_crs_41_sql_injection_attacks.conf"] [line "67"] [id "959514"] [rev "2.0.9"] [msg "Blind SQL Injection Attack"] [data "select * from user"] [severity "CRITICAL"] [tag "WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-19"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A1"] [tag "OWASP_AppSensor/CIE1"] [tag "PCI/6.5.2"]
如今有了進行異常評分,下一步就是設置咱們的閾值。這是若是當前交易分數高於此分數值,它將被拒絕。配置在Crs-setup.conf中
# Initialize anomaly scoring variables.
# All _score variables start at 0, and are incremented by the various rules
# upon detection of a possible attack.
# sql_error_match is used for shortcutting rules for performance reasons.
SecAction \
"id:901200,\
phase:1,\
nolog,\
pass,\
t:none,\
setvar:tx.anomaly_score=0,\
setvar:tx.sql_injection_score=0,\
setvar:tx.xss_score=0,\
setvar:tx.rfi_score=0,\
setvar:tx.lfi_score=0,\
setvar:tx.rce_score=0,\
setvar:tx.php_injection_score=0,\
setvar:tx.http_violation_score=0,\
setvar:tx.session_fixation_score=0,\
setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score=0,\
setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score=0,\
setvar:tx.sql_error_match=0"
經過這些當前的默認設置,異常評分模式將從阻塞的角度看起來與傳統模式相似。因爲全部關鍵等級規則都會將異常分數提升5分,這意味着即便是1個關鍵等級
規則匹配也會致使阻塞。若是您想調整異常分數以便阻止非惡意客戶(誤報)的可能性較低,則能夠將tx.inbound_anomaly_score_level設置提升到10或15等更
高的值。這說明要阻止該請求須要評分爲10或15以上,這種方法的另外一個優勢是能夠聚合多個較低嚴重性規則匹配,而後決定阻止。
REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf 中的規則,用於評估請求階段結束時的異常分數並阻止請求:
#
# -=[ Anomaly Mode: Overall Transaction Anomaly Score ]=-
#
SecRule TX:ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" \
"msg:'Inbound Anomaly Score Exceeded (Total Score: %{TX.ANOMALY_SCORE})',\
severity:CRITICAL,\
phase:request,\
id:949110,\
t:none,\
deny,\
log,\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-generic',\
setvar:tx.inbound_tx_msg=%{tx.msg},\
setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score=%{tx.anomaly_score}"
固然也能夠用特定分數來阻止,好比sql注入等。
優勢
缺點